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POLITICAL SPACE, GUARANTEED:  UTILIZING 
NEW ZEALAND’S ‘RESERVED SEATS’ SYSTEM TO 
HELP ABORIGINAL CANADIANS REALIZE THEIR 
GUARANTEED DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS 
JENNIFER HEFLER†
ABSTRACT
Despite having formally recognized the distinctiveness and importance 
of Aboriginal Rights with the enactment of section 35 of the 1982 
Constitution, Aboriginal persons continue to be under-represented 
in Canadian political institutions. This article will argue that the 
solution to this problem does not lie in section 35.  Instead, this article 
will demonstrate this historic lack of political space constitutes an 
infringement of rights guaranteed to Aboriginal Canadians under section 
3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedom. The most effective method to 
remedy this breach is through the implementation of a ‘reserved-seat’ 
system similar to that in New Zealand.    
This article begins with a brief historical summary of the relationship 
held between Canada and its Aboriginal people, moving to compare 
this with the association linking the New Zealand crown and the 
indigenous people of New Zealand – the Maori. New Zealand did not 
initially incorporate rights for the Maori in constitutional documents, 
but instead chose to allocate reserved parliamentary seats to the Maori 
people – a method that has proven quite successful. The article then 
moves to analyze the Canadian jurisprudence under section 3 of the 
Charter, demonstrating that our current electoral system and under-
representation of Aboriginal persons constitutes a breach of this right. 
Due to the inherent inequalities existent in the political sphere, only a 
method as assertive and direct as reserving seats will begin to remedy 
this  breach.    This  argument  can  withstand  justification  –  under  both  the  
Canadian liberalized view of rights and section 1 of the Charter.     
†  Jennifer  Hefler  is  a  third  year  student  at  Dalhousie  Law  School.    She  will  be  articling  
with  Osler,  Hoskin  &  Harcourt  in  Ottawa.
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In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be 
represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately.
 – John Stuart Mill1
INTRODUCTION
The  importance  of  citizen  participation  and  representation  in  the  public  
sphere  is  two-­fold.  At  the  societal  level,  political  participation  is  crucial  
to  the  proper  functioning  of  participatory  democracy  –  yet  it  is  equally  
important  at   the   individual  or  group   level,   in  creating  a  sense  of   true  
inclusion   and   belonging.  Countries   have   struggled   for   centuries  with  
how  best   to  provide  a  means   for  citizen  participation.   In   the  author’s  
view,  political  participation  in  Canada  encompass  (among  other  things)  
exercising  the  right  to  vote,  having  a  legitimate  and  effective  representa-­
tive  in  traditional  political  institutions  such  as  Parliament  and  provincial  
Legislative  Assemblies,  and  consulting  with  or  participating  in  local  and  
administrative  levels  of  governance.  
Aboriginal  Canadians  comprise  one  group  that  has  been  historically  
under-­represented  in  the  full  sphere  of  political  participation.  Interest-­
ingly,  Canada  and  New  Zealand  –  both   liberal  democracies  sharing  a  
common  British   parliamentary   tradition   –   have   pursued   different   ap-­
proaches  in  the  facilitation  and  encouragement  of  political  participation  
and   representation   of   their   respective   indigenous   populations.  While  
Canada  took  the  positive  step  of  constitutionally  acknowledging  the  col-­
lective  rights  of  Aboriginals  in  1982,2  this  recognition  has  not  specifically  
facilitated  the  public  participation  and  representation  of  Aboriginals  in  
any  meaningful  way.  Although  Aboriginal  people  possess  the  franchise,  
and  there  exists  no  law  explicitly  denying  their  participation  in  politics,  
they  nevertheless  are  not  able  to  fully  participate  in,  nor  identify  with  
mainstream  Canadian  political  institutions.  This  is  not  simply  a  flaw  in  
the  electoral  system  –  it  amounts  to  a  breach  of  democratic  rights  under  
1   J.S.  Mill,  Considerations on Representative Government  (New  York:  Longmans,  
Green,  1900)  at  53-­54.
2    Constitution Act, 1982, s.  35,  being  Schedule  B  to  the  Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),  
1982,  c.11.
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section  3  of  the  Charter.3    Indeed,  the  bare  legal  extension  of  the  right  to  
vote  –  without  the  substantive  ability  to  meaningfully  participate  and  be  
represented  in  the  public  space  –  will  not  meet  the  components  of  effec-­
tive  representation  under  section  3  and  cannot  be  saved  under  section  
1.  As  Cory  J.  notes,  “in  a  democratic  society  based  upon  the  right  of  its  
citizens  to  vote,  this  right  must  have  some  real  significance.”4 
Conversely,  New  Zealand,  early  in  its  history  (in  a  move  that  was  
ironically   manipulative   and   oppressive)   decided   to   allocate   reserved  
space   in   their  House  of  Representative   for  Maori   legislators.  Despite  
its  flaws,  this  mechanism  has  ultimately  proved  successful  in  terms  of  
creating   public   space   for   the  Maori   population   of  New  Zealand,   not  
only  within  their  legislature,  but  also  throughout  other  areas  of  political  
participation.
This   paper   therefore   asserts   that   the   constitutional   recognition   of  
Aboriginals’   rights   has   been   insufficient   to   bring  Aboriginal   people  
into  a  fully  participatory  role  within  the  mainstream  political  sphere  in  
Canada.  New  Zealand’s  system  of   reserved  seats   for   their   indigenous  
population  should  be   incorporated   into   the  Canadian  electoral  system  
as   a   starting  point   towards  meeting  what   is   guaranteed   to  Aboriginal  
people  under  section  3  of  the  Charter.  Although  some  may  view  New  
Zealand’s  system  as  drastic  or  paternalistic,  it  is  necessary.  An  analysis  
of  democratic  rights  must  not  only  engage  with  the  inherent  unfairness  
and  power  imbalances  existing  in  the  political  sphere,  but  must  recog-­
nize  that  sometimes  the  formal,  equal  right  to  vote  will  be  insufficient  
to  combat  these  inequalities.  Inadvertently,  perhaps,  New  Zealand  has  
recognized   this.  Not   only   can  Canadian  democracy   tolerate   a   similar  
change,  section  3  of  the  Charter  makes  such  a  change  essential.    
1. Aboriginal Perspectives and the Self-Government Question  
While  further  incorporating  Aboriginals  into  the  greater  democratic  dis-­
cussion  is  important,  the  debate  about  how  to  best  effect  this  has  been  
fraught  with  negativity,  distrust  and  suspicion.  Initially,  Canada’s  elec-­
3    Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part  I  of  the  Constitution Act, 1982, 
being  Schedule  B  to  the  Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),  1982,  c.11  [Charter].
4     Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.) [1991]  2  S.C.R.  158  at  
para.  2  [Saskatchewan Boundaries].
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toral  system  forced  Aboriginals  to  denounce  their  Indian  status  to  vote  
–  painting  a  picture  of  enfranchisement  as  a  tool  of  assimilation,  rather  
than  a  means  for  a  collective  society  to  participate  in  Canada’s  ‘nation-­
building.’5    Aboriginal  persons  did  not  have  a  great  deal  of  input  dur-­
ing  the  construction  of  Canada’s  political  institutions  and,  consequently,  
may  not  see  their  interests  legitimately  represented  within  them.  As  the  
New  Brunswick  Aboriginal  Council  once  stated,  “Aboriginal  voter  turn-­
out  is  low  because  native  people  feel  the  process  is  not  their  process.”6
Beyond  a  general  mistrust  of  Canadian  institutions,  it  is  also  possi-­
ble  that  Aboriginal  leaders  have  not  prioritized  representation  in  main-­
stream  legislative  institutions  for  the  reason  that  changes  of  this  nature  
may   stand   at   odds  with   their   right   to   self-­government.7      Indeed,   this  
paper  concurs  that  the  notion  of  true  self-­government  and  participation  
in   the  greater  governance  of   the  nation  are   to  a   large  extent  mutually  
incompatible.8    Furthermore,  if  both  self-­government  and  increased  par-­
ticipation  in  traditional  institutions  were  available  as  legitimate  options  
to  Aboriginal  populations  in  Canada,  self-­government  would  most  like-­
ly  be  preferred  and  most  of  the  analysis  set  out  here  would  be  irrelevant  
on  a  fundamental  level.9   
This  paper  nevertheless  surmises  that  self-­government  is  not  fully  
achievable   in   the  near  future,  and   in   its  absence,   the  creation  of  a   le-­
gitimate  democratic  space  for  Aboriginal  people  within  our  traditional  
system  of  politics  is  required.  While  others  have  made  this  argument,  
5     Canada,  Royal  Commission  on  Electoral  Reform  and  Party  Financing,  Aboriginal 
Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada, vol.  9  (Toronto:  Canada  Communication  
Group,  1991)  at  4  [RCERPF].  
6   Trevor  Knight,  “Electoral  Justice  for  Aboriginal  People  in  Canada”  (2001)  46  
McGill  L.J.  1063  at  para.  60  [Knight].
7   See  generally,  Knight,  Ibid.  Specifically,  see  para.  66.  “Many  Aboriginal  people  
argue  that  even  if  there  is  a  normative  justification  for  guaranteed  Aboriginal  
representation,  it  is  not  a  goal  worth  achieving.  Some  maintain  that  it  is  inconsistent  
with  self-­government,  and  should  be  resisted.”  
8     An  apt  example  would  be  the  likely  withdrawal  of  Quebec  federal  representatives  
in  the  event  of  its  secession.  
9     See  Melissa  Williams  “Sharing  the  River:  Aboriginal  Representation  in  Canadian  
Political  Institutions”  in  David  Laycock  ed.  Representation and Democratic 
Theory (Toronto:  UBC  Press,  2004)  93.  (“The  rationale  for  enhanced  aboriginal  
representation  in  federal  legislative  institutions  will  presumably  fade  as  the  
institutions  of  aboriginal  self-­government  develop”  at 110)  [Williams].
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this   paper   proposes   that   there   is   something   guaranteed   to  Aboriginal  
people  under  section  3  of  the  Charter  –  of  which  they  are  currently  be-­
ing  deprived  –  and  only  a  system  similar   to  New  Zealand’s  ‘reserved  
seat’  method  will  fully  remedy  this  deprivation.      
2. Relative Disadvantage and Section 15  
It   should   be   acknowledged   that   it   is   not   only  Aboriginal   people   in  
Canada  who  can  or   should  be  accorded   reserved   seats   in  Parliament,  
as  other  minority  groups  may   face  under-­representation   in   the  public  
sphere.  However,  as  New  Zealand’s  system  of  guaranteed  seats  for  their  
indigenous  people  is  central  to  the  analysis,  an  appropriate  comparison  
can  be  made  with  Canadian  Aboriginals.  Other  groups  may  have  similar  
claims  to  effective  representation  under  section  3,  yet  a  discussion  of  
those  claims  will  be  left  to  other  authors.  
Claims   from   other  minority   groups   could   lead   to   a   discussion   of  
whether  their  rights  under  section  15  of  the  Charter  are  infringed  by  a  
system  of  reserved  spots   for  Aboriginal  people,  either  as  an   initiative  
that  distinguishes  on  the  basis  of  race  or  is  under-­inclusive.  In  response,  
Aboriginal  persons  may  also  attempt  to  rely  on  section  15,  either  on  the  
basis  that  the  current  electoral  system  infringes  their  equality  rights,  or  
that  separate  electoral  districts  and  seats  can  be  justified  as  an  affirma-­
tive  action  initiative  under  section  15(2)  of  the  Charter’s  equality  rights  
provisions.  Although  these  arguments  are  intriguing,  the  improvement  
of   Canada’s   electoral   system   to   increase  Aboriginal   participation   in  
Canada  can  best  occur  under  section  3,  and  thus,  that  is  where  the  focus  
of  this  paper’s  constitutional  argument  will  lie.
I. ABORIGINALS AND THE CANADIAN STATE
The  history  of  the  relationship  between  the  Canadian  government  and  
Aboriginal  peoples10  is  one  of  colonization  and  assimilation.  While  the  
intricate  details   are  beyond   the   scope  of   this  paper,   it   is   important   to  
10   Canada  has  three  major  groups  of  native  descent  -­  Indians,  Inuit  and  Métis.  While  
the  distinct  relationship  of  each  group  with  the  Canadian  government  is  outside  
the  scope  of  analysis,  it  is  important  to  note  that  all  three  are  being  included  in  this  
paper’s  conception  of  Aboriginal  Canadians.  See  RCERPF, supra note  5  at  4.
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understand   the   relative   impact  past  attempts  and  historic  negotiations  
directed  towards  the  goal  of  incorporating  greater  Aboriginal  participa-­
tion  within  Canadian  institutions.  
The  Royal  Proclamation  of  1763  formed  one  of  the  initial  ‘agree-­
ments’  between  the  Crown  and  First  Nations.  The  text  of  the  Proclama-­
tion  recognized  one  version  of  Aboriginal  sovereignty  and  title  –  yet,  
like  other  documents  of  this  nature,  was  ambiguous  with  respect  to  what  
was  truly  agreed  upon.11  Most  Aboriginals  claim  the  written  text  of  these  
early  treaties  gave  them  control  over  their  own  affairs,  whereas  Europe-­
ans  claimed  they  had  title  to  the  land  and  only  promised  small  payments  
and  certain  rights  to  hunt  and  fish  in  return.12
At   Confederation,   the   federal   government   acquired   the   power   to  
make  the  laws  related  to  “Indians  and  Lands  reserved  for  the  Indians”  
pursuant  to  the  provision  of  section  91(24)  of  the  British North Amer-
ica Act, 1867.13  One  of   the  major  pieces  of   legislation  enacted  under  
this  power  was  the  Indian Act,14  which  provided  a  method  for  register-­
ing  entitled  persons  as  “Indians”.  Prior   to   the  mid  1900’s,  Aboriginal  
people  could  only  cast  a  vote   if   they  discounted   their   Indian  status.15 
Enfranchisement  was  essentially  about  citizenship,  and   it   required,   in  
effect,  “that  Indians  choose  between  being  ‘Indian’  citizens  or  Canadian  
ones.”16  However,  in  the  1960’s,  amendments  were  made  to  the  Act  to  
extend  the  franchise  to  status  Indians.17  Also  noteworthy  is  that  the  fed-­
eral  department  currently  known  as  Indian  and  Northern  Affairs  did  not  
becomes  a  full-­fledged  ministry  until  1966.18
11   Hamar  Foster,  “Indian  Administration  from  the  Royal  Proclamation  of  1763  to  
Constitutionally  Entrenched  Aboriginal  Rights”  in  Paul  Havemann,  ed.,  Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  
Press,  1999)  351  at  355  [Foster].
12     See  Shin  Imai,  Aboriginal Law Handbook, (Toronto:  Thomson  Canada  Ltd.,  
1993)  at  25  [Imai].
13    Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.),  30  &  31  Vict.,  c.  3,  s.  91,  reprinted  in  R.S.C.  1985,  
App.  II,  No.  5.
14     R.S.C.  1985,  c.  I-­5.
15     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  4.
16   Foster,  supra note  11  at  361.
17   RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  4.
18     Foster,  supra note  11  at  361.
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As  early  as  the  1970s,  Aboriginal  organizations  began  explicitly  to  
discuss  the  possibility  of  more  concrete  participation  and  representation  
for  Aboriginal  persons  within  the  Canadian  legislature.19  In  1978,  major  
proposals   for   constitutional   reform  were   initiated   and   representatives  
of   three   national  Aboriginal   organizations  were   invited   to   participate  
at  a  First  Ministers’  meeting.  These  representatives  wanted  Aboriginal  
rights  guaranteed  in  a  new  constitution  and  were  concerned  that  the  im-­
plementation  of  the  Charter  would  modify  or  deny  the  existence  of  these  
rights.20    The  lobbying  that  occurred  on  behalf  of  Aboriginal  groups  for  
a   constitutional   provision   enshrining  Aboriginal   rights   demonstrated  
that  Aboriginal  people  were  “seeking  recognition  […]  within  Canadian  
federalism;;  the  goal  –  to  achieve  power  by  being  political  actors  in  the  
[c]onstitutional  game.”21 
Nothing  officially  occurred  until  January  30,  1981,  when  members  
of  a  Joint  Senate  and  House  of  Commons  committee  agreed  with   the  
leaders  of   three  national  Aboriginal  organizations  on  a  Constitutional  
provision   recognizing  Aboriginal  and   treaty   rights.22     The   text  of   this  
provision  would  become  section  35  of  Canada’s  Constitution Act, 1982,  
the  language  of  which  read:
s.35     (1)  The  existing  aboriginal  and  treaty  rights  of  the  aboriginal  
peoples  of  Canada  are  hereby  recognized  and  affirmed.  
   (2)   In   this   act,   “Aboriginal   peoples   of  Canada”   includes  
the  Indian,  Inuit  and  Metis  peoples  of  Canada.23
The   entrenchment   of  Aboriginal   rights   formally  within   the  Constitu-­
tion  has  generated  much  debate,  commentary,  and  jurisprudence.  One  
scholar   notes   that   section   35  was  meant   to   offer   an   “opportunity   for  
Aboriginal  people  to  participate  in,  and  to  influence  directly,  a  process  
which  would  fundamentally  restructure  the  institutions  and  rules  gov-­
19     See  generally  The  Report  Submitted  by  the  Native  Council  of  Canada  found  in  
RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  7.
20     William  F.  Pentney,  The Aboriginal Rights Provisions in the Constitution Act, 
1982  (Saskatchewan:  Native  Law  Centre,  1987)  at  1  [Pentney].
21    Ibid.  at  12.
22     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  8.
23    Constitution Act, 1982, supra note  2.
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erning  Canadian  affairs.”24  However,  as  will  be  discussed,   section  35  
has  proven  somewhat  unsuccessful  in  terms  of  incorporating  Aborigi-­
nals  into  Canada’s  governance.
There  have  been  several  negotiations  and  conversations  held  around  
the  incorporation  of  Aboriginal  perspectives  into  Canadian  political  in-­
stitutions,  specifically  in  terms  of  guaranteed  seats  in  the  House  of  Com-­
mons  or  Senate.  For  example,  the  Royal  Commission  on  Electoral  Re-­
form  and  Party  Financing  (RCEFPF)  conducted  a  comprehensive  study  
on  Aboriginal  peoples  and  electoral  reform,  in  which  Aboriginal  people  
proposed  the  creation  of  special  electoral  districts  and  guaranteed  rep-­
resentation  in  a  reformed  Senate.25  Certain  Aboriginal  groups  opposed  
these  suggestions,  due  to  a  fear  that  any  such  changes  might  infringe  on  
their   treaty  rights.26  The  report  of   the  RCEFPF  recommended  a  proc-­
ess  of  incorporating  Aboriginal  constituencies  in  each  province,  in  the  
form  of  “Aboriginal  Electoral  Districts”.  These  districts  would  allow  a  
portion  of  each  province’s  share  of  legislative  seats  to  be  designated  as  
special  Aboriginal   constituencies.  The   size  and  number  of   these  con-­
stituencies  would  be  based  on  numbers  of  self-­identifying  Aboriginals.27 
These  recommendations  were  never  implemented.
Another  important  event  was  the  Charlottetown  Accord  in  August  
1992.  Present  at  this  constitutional  discussion  were  the  federal,  provin-­
cial  and   territorial  governments,  and  representatives   from  the  Assem-­
bly  of  First  Nations,  the  Native  Council  of  Canada,  the  Inuit  Tapirisat  
of  Canada  and  the  Metis  National  Council.28  Issues  raised  during  these  
negotiations  included  the  possibility  of  constitutionally  recognizing  an  
inherent  right  of  Aboriginal  self-­government,  a  dramatic  enhancement  
of  Aboriginal  representation  in  both   the  House  of  Commons  and  in  a  
reformed  Senate,  and  an  entrenched  role  for  Aboriginal  peoples  in  the  
appointment  of  justices  to  the  Supreme  Court.29  The  discussion  on  allo-­
cating  parliamentary  seats  to  Aboriginals  suggested  making  these  seats  
additional   to   any   existing   provincial   and   territorial   seats,   rather   than  
24     Pentney,  supra note  20  at  22.
25     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  41.
26     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  46.
27     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  48-­49.
28     Williams,  supra note  9  at  98.
29     Williams,  supra note  9  at  98.
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drawing  from  a  province’s  current  allocation  of  seats.  This  accord  did  
not  specify  the  number  of  seats  to  be  held.30
Finally,  the  Royal  Commission  on  Aboriginal  Peoples  (RCAP)  ex-­
plored   increasing  Aboriginal   participation,   but   in   the   context   of   self-­
government.  The  RCAP  final   report  advocated   the  creation  of  a   third  
chamber  of  parliament  –  the  “House  of  First  Nations”  –  which  would  
have  ‘real  power’  to  initiate  legislation  and  require  a  majority  vote  on  
matters  crucial  to  Aboriginal  people.  This  suggestion,  however,  would  
have  required  a  constitutional  amendment  and  faced  the  problem  of  how  
this  House  would  ever  win  a  vote  when  the  other  houses  of  Parliament  
could  outvote  it.31
While   the   improvement   of   Aboriginal   political   participation   has  
been   an   ongoing   discussion,  Canada   has   not  made  much   progress   in  
the  achievement  of   any  meaningful  mechanism   for   this  participation.  
Aboriginal  people  constitute  a  special  community  of  interest,  one  which  
has  not  been  adequately  reflected  in  the  House  of  Commons,  the  Senate,  
the  judiciary  or  the  federal  bureaucracy.  Their  under-­representation  not  
only  weakens  the  validity  of  our  legislative  process,  but  indeed,  “calls  
into  question  the  legitimacy  of  Parliament  itself.”32 
II. FROM OPPRESSIVE CREATION TO PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 
– THE EXAMPLE OF NEW ZEALAND
New  Zealand  is  both  a  constitutional  monarchy  and  a  liberal  democracy,  
with  a  Parliament  of  elected  representatives.33  New  Zealand’s  govern-­
ment  structure  is  similar  to  Canada’s,  where  Parliament  is  the  central  in-­
stitution  and  the  executive  branch  requires  the  Parliament’s  confidence  
in  order   to  govern.  The  main  source  of   the  New  Zealand  constitution  
is  the  Constitution Act 1986,  but  their  constitutional  framework  is  also  
found   in   customary   practices,   conventions,   court   decisions   and   other  
acts  of  Parliament  and  legal  documents.34  Perhaps  due  to  its  constitu-­
30     Williams,  supra note  9  at  99.
31     Williams,  supra note  9  at  101.
32     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  48.
33     Geoffrey  Palmer,  New Zealand’s Constitution in Crisis – Reforming Our Political 
System  (Dunedin:  McIndoe  Ltd.,  1992)  at  5  [Palmer].
34    Constitution Act 1986 (N.Z.).  See  also  Palmer,  Ibid  at  5:  “New  Zealand  does  
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tion’s  fluid  nature,  New  Zealand  has  not  explicitly  recognized  the  rights  
of  Maori.  In  fact,  it  has  taken  a  different  approach  to  forming  a  workable  
‘partnership’  between  the  pakeha  (persons  of  European  descent)  and  the  
Maori,  in  order  to  increase  the  political  participation  of  this  indigenous  
population.  
Before   the   arrival   of   settlers,  Maori   tribes   lived   in   self-­sufficient  
communities  of  whanau  (extended  families).  Multiple  whanau  together  
made  up  their  political  units  called  the  iwi  (the  tribes).35    After  years  of  
conflict  with  European  settlers  over  land,  the  Maori  population  had  been  
significantly   reduced   and   they   agreed   to   participate   in   discussions   to  
negotiate  an  agreement  over  land  use  and  government.
In  1840,  the  Treaty of Waitangi36  was  signed  between  several  Maori  
chiefs  and  the  Crown  –  a  document  which  was  formally  referred  to  as  
New  Zealand’s  “ancient  constitution”37  and  which  has  now  been  consti-­
tutionally  recognized  as  a  founding  document  of  New  Zealand.38      Arti-­
cle  2  of  the  Treaty  gave  the  right  of  tino rangatiratanga  to  Maori.  The  
Maori  people  interpreted  this  article  as  the  right  of  “entire  chieftainship”  
–   essentially  meaning   control   over   their   lands   and   treasured   things.39 
Much  of   the  Maori   demands   for   increased   share   in   the   governing   of  
New  Zealand,  stem  from  this  perceived  right  of  chieftainship.    
not  have  a  constitution  in  the  way  that  Canada  does.  The  New  Zealand  constitution  
establishes  the  major  institutions  of  government,  but  it  is  more  of  ‘an  idea,  a  
conception  or  series  of  conceptions  found  in  the  law’  ”.  
35     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  69.
36    Treaty of Waitangi,  Lieutenant  Governor  of  New  Zealand  (on  behalf  of  her  
Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  Great  Britain  and  Ireland)  and  the  
Maori  Chiefs  and  Tribes  of  New  Zealand,  6  February  1840.
37     J.G.A.  Pocock,  “Law,  Sovereignty  and  History  in  a  Divided  Culture:  The  Case  
of  New  Zealand  and  the  Treaty  of  Waitangi”  (1997-­1998)  43  McGill  L.J.  481  at  497  
[Pocock]. 
38     Palmer,  supra note  33  at  6.
39     Alan  Ward  and  Janine  Hayward,  “Tino  Rangatiratanga,  Maori  in  the  Political  
and  Administrative  System”  in  Paul  Havemann  ed.,  Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1999  378  at  
380  [Ward].
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1. Representation in Parliament 
After  years  of  conflict  and  struggle  between  the  Maori  and  the  pakeha,  
it  was  determined  that  “avoidance  of  conflict  and  protection  of  Maori  
lay   in   incorporating   them  ultimately…into  mainstream  institutions.”40 
In  1845,  the  number  of  settlers  was  growing  in  New  Zealand  and  dis-­
cussions  ensued  on  the  possibility  of  creating  municipalities  and  voting  
rights.  The  right  to  vote  was  designed  to  include  Maori,  as  Europeans  
realized  the  Maori  population  posed  a  formidable  adversary,  whose  co-­
operation  would  facilitate  in  the  orderly  development  of  New  Zealand  
society.  The  Secretary  of  the  Colonies  tried  to  contain  the  franchise  of  
Maori  by  restricting  it  to  possession  of  property  and  ability  to  read  and  
write  in  English.41    Representative  government  was  then  granted  in  the  
Constitution Act 1852,  with   a   property   qualification   on   the   franchise  
which  was  intended  to  block  Maori  participation.42    It  succeeded  to  some  
extent,  as  only  eight  Maori  individuals  qualified  for  the  vote.  However,  
the  Waiarapa  chief,  who  did  hold  property  at  this  time,  registered  as  a  
voter  and  the  electoral  meeting  for  the  district  was  actually  held  at  his  
home.  43
In  1860,  Maori  chiefs  complained  that  they  were  not  receiving  equal  
treatment  with  the  settlers  in  the  councils  of  the  state.  They  asked  that  
Maori  be  enabled  to  participate  in  the  General  Assembly,  regardless  of  
language  difference.44    A  politician  named  Fitzgerald  requested  that  no  
law  be  passed  that  did  not  give  Maori  equal  civil  and  political  privileges,  
and  proposed  that  Maori  be  brought  into  the  Government,  Parliament  
and  the  provincial  councils  without  delay.  Although  the  motion  was  re-­
jected   at   this   stage,   it   remained   a   live   issue.45      Finally,   in   an   attempt  
to  end  the  ongoing  conflict  between  cultures,  Fitzgerald  was  asked  to  
draft  a  bill,  which  would  provide  for  Maori  representation,  entitled  the  
Maori Representation Act 1867.46    At  the  time  of  its  enactment,  the  act  
40    Ibid.  at  379.
41     Ward,  supra note  39  at  381.
42     Ward,  supra note  39  at  382.
43     Ward,  supra note  39  at  383.
44     Ward,  supra note  39  at  385.
45     Ward,  supra note  39  at  385.
46    Maori Representation Act (N.Z.), 1867.
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divided   the   entire   country   into   four   electoral   districts.47  The   bill  was  
meant  to  last  only  five  years  and  allocated  four  seats  to  Maori.  It  was  
thought  that  by  allocating  this  space  to  Maori  in  Parliament,  and  giv-­
ing  the  Maori  the  ability  to  vote  for  fellow  members  of  the  indigenous  
population,   the   government   could   appear   culturally   tolerant,   appease  
Maori  and  yet  maintain  social  control  over  this  segment  of  the  popula-­
tion.48  If  anything,  reserved  seats  were  used  as  a  mechanism  to  prevent  
any  attempt  by  the  Maori  to  set  up  a  separate  power  base  to  circumvent  
parliamentary  authority.49  
Despite  this  motivation,  guaranteed  seats  have,  over  time,  become  
a  positive  re-­enforcement  for  Maori  values  and  identity.  Although  the  
first  elections  for  Maori  seats  were  not  well  publicized  –  or  hotly  con-­
tested  –  Maori  were  quick  to  apprehend  the  importance  of  parliamentary  
representation.  The  two  distinct  types  of  representation  –  the  Maori  and  
the  general  –  were  eventually  integrated  into  a  single,  comprehensive  
system.50  Maori  representatives  did  not  sit  in  a  separate  chamber,  rather,  
they  possessed  full  voting  rights  on  all  issues  and  by  1974,  any  person  
of  any  degree  of  Maori  could  choose   to  opt   for   the  Maori  or  general  
election  roll.51  Indeed,  as  Ward  acknowledges,  “a  measure  that  was  in-­
tended  to  be  transitional  and  temporary  was  renewed  and  has  remained  
to  the  present  day.”52  
Throughout   the  1970’s  and  1980’s   there  were   two  major  political  
parties  in  the  House  of  Representatives:  the  Labour  Party  and  the  Na-­
tional  Party.  At  this  time,  elections  were  conducted  through  a  first-­past-­
the-­post-­system.53    The  Labour  Party  realized  the  strength  of  the  Maori  
movement   and   formed   an   alliance   with   the   nominees   for   the  Maori  
seats,  who  became  official   “Labour”  candidates   for   a  period  of   time.  
The  first  Maori   political   party  was  Ratana,   but,   as   one   author   notes,  
Maori  continued  to  align  themselves  with  the  Labour  party  in  order  reap  
47     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  71.
48     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  72:  “Did  separate  representation  convey  an  enlightened  
response  to  protect  Maori  interests?  Or  was  it  nothing  more  than  a  deceptively  
manipulative  ruse  of  political  expediency  for  social  control?”  
49     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  72.  
50     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  70.
51     Ward,  supra note  39  at  397  
52     Ward,  supra note  39  at  386.
53     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  73-­74.
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the  benefits  of  certain  social  programs.54    A  new  Maori  party  emerged  
in  the  early  1980s,  which  reflected  the  Maori  disenchantment  with  La-­
bour  policies  of  market  liberalization.  This  party  was  called  Mana Mo-
tuhake,  and  although  it  diminished  total  support  for  Labour,  it  failed  to  
pry  Maori  seats  away  from  the  Labour  party.55    In  fact,  it  was  not  until  
1993,   that   a   new   political   party,  New  Zealand   First,  won   the  North-­
ern  Maori  constituency,  breaking  the  half-­century  Labour  monopoly  of  
Maori  seats.56     
2. A Change of Electoral System
In  a  move   that  proved   to   further  promote  Maori   representation,  New  
Zealand  adopted  a  system  of  proportional  representation  called  Mixed  
Member  Proportional  (MMP)  in  1996.  A  Royal  Commission  formed  to  
study  the  Electoral  System  believed  that  MMP  would  provide  “fairer,  
provide  better  representation  and  allow  for  wide  participation  in  New  
Zealand  politics   than  First-­Past-­the-­Post.”57     One  of   the  main  reasons  
given  for  why  MMP  was  a  more  ‘fair’  electoral  system  was  its  ability  
to   increase   the   election  of   individuals   from  minority   groups,   such   as  
Maori.  To  a   small  but  notable   extent,   this  has   actually  occurred.  The  
new  MMP  system  changed  the  Electoral  Act58  to  make  the  number  of  
Maori  electorates  based  on  the  numbers  of  New  Zealanders  of  Maori  
descent  choosing  to  enter  their  names  of  the  Maori  roll.59    The  result  at  
the  time  was  to  increase  the  number  of  reserved  electoral  districts  for  
Maori  from  four  to  five  and  the  total  number  of  Maori  elected  that  year  
was  fifteen.60 
54     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  73.  One  of  the  major  pieces  of  the  Labour  
Government’s  platform  was  their  comprehensive  social  security  system  
encompassing  the  Maori  people.  
55     Jeffrey  Karp,  Jack  Vowles,  Peter  Aimer  &  Susan  Banducci,  eds.,  Voter’ Victory? 
New Zealand’s First Election Under Proportional Representation  (Auckland,  New  
Zealand:  Auckland  University  Press,  1998)  at  173  [Karp].
56    Ibid.  at  171.
57     Karp,  supra note  55  at  192.
58    Electoral Act 1993  (N.Z.),  1993/87.
59     Karp,  supra note  55  at  171.
60   Karp,  supra note  55  at  171.
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Presently,  the  manner  in  which  the  system  functions  is  as  follows:  
New   Zealand’s   unicameral   Parliament   has   increased   in   size   to   120  
members,  sixty-­five  of  which  are  elected  as  candidates  under  first  past  
the  post  rules,  where  the  candidate  who  receives  the  greatest  number  of  
votes  wins  the  seat.  The  remaining  Members  of  Parliament  are  elected  
by  means  of  a  party  vote  from  closed  national  lists  supplied  by  political  
parties,  which  includes  the  current  six  Maori  districts.  The  list  Members  
are  allocated  so  as  to  “top  up  the  party  share  of  seats  in  the  House  to  en-­
sure  proportionality  according  to  the  overall  distribution  of  party  votes  
cast.”61  
3. The Bureaucracy and Local Government
Participation  in  government,  of  course,  extends  beyond  the  election  of  
Parliamentarians.      In   the   early   1900s,   not   only   could  Maori   national  
representation  be  found  on   local  or   regional  councils  and  committees  
in  New  Zealand,  but   the  General  Assembly  attempted   to  give  official  
recognition  to  runangas  (Maori  councils)  by  empowering  local  runan-
gas  with  the  ability  to  pass  by-­laws  to  regulate  civil  issues  with  the  lo-­
cal  resident  magistrate.62    Although  this  initiative  may  be  classified  as  
something  closer  to  self-­government,  it  marks  an  important  attempt  at  
cooperation  between  the  pakeha  and  Maori,  in  an  effort  to  make  ‘space’  
for  the  Maori  concerns.  These  concerns  have  also  garnered  greater  at-­
tention  through  the  Waitangi  Tribunal,  a  board  specifically  designed  to  
hear  Maori   claims  arising  out  of  performance  or  non-­performance  of  
provisions  under  the  Treaty of Waitangi.  The  tribunal  makes  recommen-­
dations  that  go  to  the  Ministry  and  in  the  last  few  decades,  the  tribunal  
has  served  to  strongly  influence  the  courts,  legislature  and  the  executive  
branch  of  government.63 
The  bureaucracy  also  recognizes  the  importance  of  incorporating  a  
Maori  perspective  in  areas  of  governance  and  policy.  Almost  all  gov-­
61   Karp,  supra note  55  at  2.
62     Ward,  supra note  39  at  389.
63     Paul  Havemann,  “Administering  Indigenous  Affairs  Citizenship  and  Self-­
Determination”  in  Paul  Havemann,  ed. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1999)  at  334  
[Havemann].
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ernment  departments  have  a  Maori  division  and  the  Ministry  of  Maori  
Affairs  “acts  as  a  legislative  watchdog  for  Maori  interests,”64  incorpo-­
rating  a  Maori  perspective  into  all  enacted  legislation.  As  early  as  1948,  
the  Secretary  of  Maori  Affairs  was  of  Maori  descent65    –  a  far  cry  from  
Canada’s   selection   record   for   the   position   of  Minister   of   Indian   and  
Northern  Affairs.  66  
Maori  participation  in  local  government  has  continued  to  expand  in  
recent  years.  The  Local Government Act,67  enacted  in  2002,  requires  all  
councils  to  establish  and  maintain  opportunities  for  Maori  to  contribute  
to  decision-­making  processes.  Specifically,  if  a  council  is  making  a  de-­
cision  involving  a  body  of  water,  it  must  take  into  account  the  relation-­
ship  of  Maori  and  their  culture  and  traditions  with  their  ancestral  land.68 
Since  1997,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  number  of  councils  that  
formally  engage  with  Maori.69    The  New  Zealand  Department  of  Inter-­
nal  Affairs  published  a  study   in  2004  which  found   that  councils  with  
formal  consultation  processes  with  Maori  increased  from  16  in  1997,  to  
69  in  2004.70
Although  the  system  of  Maori  guaranteed  seats  started  from  a  premise  
of  control,  this  assertive  method  to  include  Maori  in  mainstream  politics  
proved  to  successfully  combat  inequalities  within  the  political  arena.  As  
one  author  notes,  
64     Ward,  supra note  39  at  394.
65     Ward,  supra note  39  at  394.
66   See  generally  Ward,  supra note  39  at  364.  
67  Local Government Act 2002 (N.Z.),  2002/84.
68     Government  of  New  Zealand.  “Maori  Participation  in  Local  Government”  
Government  of  New  Zealand,  online:  <http://www.localcouncils.govt.nz/LGIP.nsf/
wpg_URL/About-­Local-­Government-­Participation>.
69    Ibid.
70   New  Zealand:  Department  of  Internal  Affairs  and  Te  Puni  Kokiri,  
“Local  Authority  Engagement  with  Maori”,  (July  2004)  Government  of  
New  Zealand,  online:  <http://www.lgnz.co.nz/library/files/store_005/
Localauthorityengagementwithmaori2004.pdf>.  It  is  acknowledged  that  there  are  
many  local  governments  that  consult  with  Aboriginal  Canadians.  However,  this  
description  of  New  Zealand  is  meant  to  demonstrate  how  they  have  blended  these  
consultations  into  almost  every  government  decision,  whereas  in  Canada,  aboriginal  
questions  have  largely  remained  a  ‘separate’  sphere.  
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the  main  avenues  by  which  Maori   engaged  with   the  processes  of  
government  and  administration  were   through  the  four  seats   in   the  
national   Parliament,   [eventually]   this   led   to   having   members   on  
the  Legislative  Council  and  through  the  local  councils  dealing  with  
health  and  sanitation.71  
In  other  words,  the  inclusion  of  Maori  through  reserved  legislative  seats  
has  broader  participation,  not  only  in  a  formal  representative  institution,  
but  throughout  New  Zealand’s  public  sphere.  
III. A SUCCESSFUL SYSTEM…
In  order  to  evaluate  the  success  guaranteed  seats  have  had  in  terms  of  in-­
creasing  Maori  participation,  an  empirical  measurement  must  be  made  
of   any   improvement   seen   to   the   lives  of   indigenous  people.     For   the  
purposes  of  this  paper,  “improvement  to  the  lives  of  indigenous  people”  
will  be  limited  to  benefits  commonly  associated  with  public  participa-­
tion,  such  as  increased  voter  participation,  and  augmented  numbers  of  
representatives  in  traditional  political  institutions.
The  system  of  reserved  seats  in  New  Zealand  has  transcended  the  
context  of  oppression  and  control  in  which  it  was  created,  becoming  a  
tool  of  participation  which  Maori  embrace  and  value.  In  fact,  there  have  
been  occasions  over  the  past  few  decades  where  the  government  consid-­
ered  abolishing  these  seats;;  however  Maori  strongly  opposed  these  pro-­
posals,  claiming  the  seats  were  central  to  their  identity  and  survival.72 
Electoral  reform  has  helped  to   increase  the  number  of  seats  reserved,  
making  the  number  more  proportionally  representative  of  the  percent-­
age  of  the  populations  that  self-­identifies  as  Maori.  
Additional  improvements  to  the  political  lives  of  the  Maori  –  which,  
have  arguably  grown  from  the  initial  system  of  reserved  seats  –  include  
the   recognition   of   Maori   structures,   mainstreaming   federal   agencies  
to   ensure   a  Maori  dimension   to   the  public   service,   acceptance  of   the  
Treaty of Waitangi  as  a  solemn  contract  between  the  founding  partners  
of  the  country,  and  inclusion  of  Maori  at  all  levels  of  governance.73      All  
members  of  the  public  service  also  receive  “Maori  training,”  a  cultural  
71   Ward,  supra note  39  at  391.
72     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  81-­82.
73     See  generally  Havemann,  supra  note  63.
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awareness   program   comprised   of   learning   (among   other   things)   key  
Maori   linguistic   terms,   and   appropriate   greeting   behaviours.74   Cer-­
tainly,  this  training  is  a  strong  indication  of  the  progress  made  in  terms  
of  the  Maori  population  being  viewed  as  a  governing  partner  and  sets  
New   Zealand   apart   from   Canada,   where   very   few  Aboriginal   repre-­
sentatives  have  even  been  elected  in  the  House  of  Commons.75     Even  
beyond  this  pure  ‘numbers’  game,  many  Aboriginal  people  feel  discon-­
nected  and  discontented  with  traditional  Canadian  structures.  One  Abo-­
riginal  writer  notes  that  under-­representation  in  an  institution  as  central  
to  the  Canadian  democratic  system  as  Parliament  will  inevitably  result  
in  fewer  benefits  for  Aboriginal  persons  and  less  access  to  benefits  the  
democratic  system  provides.76 
Overall,  while   the   rights   guaranteed   in   section   35   of   the  Charter  
have  provided  some  justice  for  Aboriginal  people,  it  would  be  a  mistake  
to  rely  solely  on  section  35  to  remedy  all  inequalities  Aboriginal  people  
face,   particularly   under-­inclusive   democratic   structures.  A   better   tool  
for  this  task  is  section  3.  
The  constitutional  choices  New  Zealand  made  –  although  perhaps  
unintended  –  have  ultimately  had  the  effect  of  increasing  the  political  
voice  of  Maori.  New  Zealand  did  not  initially  enshrine  rights  for  their  
indigenous  population  in  their  constitution,  choosing  instead  to  imple-­
ment  a  system  of  reserved  seats.  It  is  contended  that  this  allowed  other  
means  of  political  participation  to  develop,  proving  to  be  exactly  what  
was  needed  to  combat  the  inequalities,  economic  injustices  and  power  
imbalances  which  have  existed  in  New  Zealand’s  public  space.  
The  subsequent  portion  of  this  paper  will  outline  why,  constitutionally,  
the  most  ideal  method  to  increase  Aboriginal  participation  in  Canada  
is  a  system  of  reserved  seats.  Although  there  will  be  some  discussion  
as  to  how  these  seats  could  be  implemented,  the  exact  electoral  
mechanics  fall  outside  the  scope  of  this  analysis.  The  specific  
argument  presented  here  is  that,  as  compared  to  solutions  which  some  
might  term  less  drastic,  only  directly  “saving  space”  in  our  legislature  
74    Interview  with  Fiona  McDonald,  Doctoral  Law  Student  from  New  Zealand.  
Interview:  03/11/05  0900.    Note  McDonald  underwent  such  Maori  training  
personally.
75     Knight,  supra note  6  at  para.  6.
76   James  Youngblood  Henderson,  “Empowering  Treaty  Federalism”  (1994)  58  Sask.  
L.  Rev.  241  at  325  [Henderson].
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for  Aboriginals  has  sufficient  force  to  combat  existing  inequalities  and  
meet  the  right  of  effective  representation  as  guaranteed  under  section  3  
of  the  Charter.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORIGINAL SEATS
1. What Does Section 3 Protect and How Has This Right Been 
Denied to Aboriginal People?
Section  3  of  the  Charter states:  “[e]very  citizen  of  Canada  has  the  right  
to  vote  in  an  election  of  members  of  the  House  of  Commons  or  of  a  
legislative  assembly  and  to  be  qualified  for  membership  therein.”77 In 
Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.)78,   the  Supreme  
Court  of  Canada,  in  considering  section  3’s  purpose,  held  that  the  right  
to   vote   is   the   right   to   “effective   representation.”79  One   of   the  major  
conditions  needed  to  achieve  such  representation  is  relative  parity  of  
voting   power   –  meaning   that   everyone   has   a   vote   of   relative   equal  
weight.  However,  the  Court  has  declared  that  deviations  from  absolute  
voter  parity  in  the  creation  of  electoral  districts  are  not  only  acceptable  
–  such  factors  that  may  be  taken  into  consideration  include  geography,  
community  history,   community   interests   and  minority   representation  
-­  but  also  necessary,  as  it  is  impossible  to  draw  boundary  lines  which  
guarantee  exactly  the  same  number  of  voters  in  each  district.  80    More  
will  be  said  with  respect  to  deviating  from  strict  voter  parity  and  how  
additional  considerations  under  ‘effective  representation’  relate  to  Abo-­
riginal  participation,  however  a  full  understanding  of  section  3  requires  
looking  to  jurisprudence  that  has  considered  this  right  in  other  contexts  
beyond  electoral  districts.  
77  Charter, supra note  3.
78    Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4.
79     Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4  at  para.  49.
80     See  generally  Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4  at  paras.  50-­56.  (Canada  
does  not  maintain  a  strict  interpretation  of  ‘one-­person-­one  vote’  –  as  there  are  many  
competing  factors  to  consider  and  a  contextual  analysis  is  necessary).  
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In Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General),81   the   Supreme   Court  
found  a  law  that  restricted  official  registered  party  status  to  political  par-­
ties  with  candidates  in  at  least  fifty  electoral  districts  violated  section  3.  
Parties  without  status  could  not  enjoy  certain  benefits,  most  notably  the  
right  of  their  party’s  candidates  to  list  their  party  affiliation  on  the  ballot  
paper.82  The  Court’s  analysis  expanded  the  understanding  of  the  rights  
in  section  3,  moving  beyond  the  simple  ability  to  cast  a  vote;;  towards  a  
broader  right  of  meaningful  participation:    
[T]he  purpose  of  section  3  includes  not  only  the  right  of  each  citizen  
to  have  and  to  vote  for  an  elected  representative  in  Parliament  or  a  
legislative  assembly,  but  also  to  the  right  of  each  citizen  to  play  a  
meaningful  role  in  the  electoral  process.  This,  in  my  view,  is  a  more  
complete  statement  of  s.3  of  the  Charter.83
In  other  words,  section  3  protects  the  electoral  process,  but  this  process  
is  not  limited  to  the  selection  of  elected  representatives.  It  includes  the  
ability  to  voice  concerns,  to  share  an  identity  in  a  governing  system  and  
create  a  space  for,  “the  open  debate  that  animates  the  determination  of  
social  policy.”84 
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)85  further  illustrates  the  rights  
that  section  3  aims  to  protect  through  a  discussion  around  the  relation-­
ship  between  the  Charter’s  sections  3  and  2(b)  (the  right  to  free  expres-­
sion).  This  case  involved  a  challenge  to  laws  which  limited  the  adver-­
tising  expenses  of  third  parties  in  electoral  campaigns.  The  majority  of  
the  court  held  that  while  section  2(b)  was  violated,  the  restrictions  were  
nevertheless  justified  under  section  1  because  the  ability  of  third  parties  
to  fund  certain  political  activities  was  restricted;;  therefore,  it  was  justifi-­
able  in  order  to  promote  equal  dissemination  of  political  views.  While  
the  right  of  freedom  of  expression  found  in  section  2(b)  of  the  Charter 
protects  the  ability  of  each  individual  to  express  themselves,86  no  inter-­
nal  check  exists  within  this  right  to  cope  with  the  reality  that  the  more  
81     [2003]  1  S.C.R.  912  [Figueroa].
82    Ibid.  at  para.  4.
83    Figueroa, supra note  81  at  para.  25.
84     Figueroa, supra note  81  at  para.  29.
85     [2004]  1  S.C.R.  827  [Harper].
86     See,  R.J.  Sharpe  &  K.  Roach,  eds.  The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3rd  ed.  
(Toronto:  Irwin  Law,  2005)  [Sharpe].
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powerful  and  wealthy  may  be  able  to  express  themselves  more  effec-­
tively  than  others.  Conversely,  Bastarache  J.  recognized  in  Harper  that  
laws  challenged  under  section  3  are  permitted  to  recognize  the  power  
imbalances  that  exist  in  the  political  sphere  and  society  in  general.  Laws  
will  not  infringe  section  3  if  they  attempt  to  create  a  level  playing  field  
for  those  who  wish  to  engage  in  the  electoral  discourse.87    Thus,  section  
3  is  meant  to  protect  and  enforce  the  level  playing  field  which,  ideally,  
democracy  should  be  based  on.          
The  structure  of  Canadian  society,  including  the  historical  relation-­
ship  Aboriginal  people  hold  within  the  Canadian  state,  is  such  that  Abo-­
riginal  people  are  not  receiving  the  full  rights  guaranteed  under  section  
3   as   these   democratic   rights   have   been   defined   in   the   jurisprudence.  
Although   a   proponent   of   individual   rights  might   argue   that   no   claim  
exists  for  Aboriginals  under  section  3  –  as  each  Aboriginal  person  has  
the  right  to  cast  a  vote,  and  theoretically  could  participate  to  any  extent  
they  desire  –  the  Court  has  held  that  the  democratic  rights  under  sec-­
tion  3  are  about  more  than  simply  ensuring  everyone  is  legally  entitled  
to  vote.  A  ‘formal’  approach  to  equality  –  where  every  person  has  one  
vote   and   one   equal   ‘chance’   to   put   their   representative   in   the  House  
of  Commons  –  should  give  way  to  a  more  substantively  equal  system  
of  truly  effective  representation.88  This  was  the  effect  of  Saskatchewan 
Boundaries,  as  it  “[began]  to  recognize  concerns  for  the  kind  of  substan-­
tive  justice  that  Charter  s.15  jurisprudence  has  recognized,  […]  as  real  
equality  sometimes  demands  different  treatment.”89  
Not  only  is  the  bare  ability  to  vote  achieve  substantive  equality,  but  
the  democratic  rights  protected  in  section  3  are  comprised  of  much  more  
than   simply   electing   a   representative.  While   there   have   been   a   small  
number  of  Aboriginals  elected  to  Parliament,  the  components  of  effec-­
87    Ibid. 
88     See  generally  Iris  Marion  Young,  Justice and the Politics of Difference, 
(Princeton,  New  Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press,  1990)  at  158.  Young’s  theory  of  
the  ‘politics  of  difference’  holds  that  true  representation  and  equality  of  participation  
and  inclusion  of  all  groups  sometimes  requires  different  treatment  for  oppressed  or  
disadvantaged  groups.
89     K.  Roach,  “Chartering  the  Electoral  Map  Into  the  Future”  in  J.  Courtney,  P.  
MacKinnon  &  D.E.  Smith,  eds.,  Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and 
Electoral Values, (Saskatoon:  Fifth  House,  1992)  at  200  [Roach].
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tive   representation  have  never   been   a   reality   for  Aboriginals.  As  one  
author  notes,  
Aboriginal  people  have  no  true  voice  to  assert  their  rights  in  Parliament  
or  in  the  legislative  assemblies.  They  are  still  organized  lobbyists  or  
plaintiffs  outside  the  formal  structure  of  government.”90 
This   lack   of   effective   representation   can   be   addressed   in   a  way   that  
meets  the  demands  of  section  3  of  the  Charter.
2. Reserved Seats will Address the Rights Found in Section 3
Although  most  of  the  section  3  jurisprudence  has  not  arisen  out  of  a  tra-­
ditional  minority  rights  context,  a  strong  argument  can  be  made  based  
on   the  Court’s   interpretation   of   section   3   that   electoral   laws   and   the  
drafting  of  electoral  district  boundaries  must  begin  to  embrace  the  rep-­
resentation  of  minorities,  and  in  particular,  Aboriginal  Canadians.  Tra-­
ditionally,  rural  voters  were  thought  to  have  different  concerns  than  ur-­
ban  voters,  and  electoral  boundaries  were  drawn  accordingly.  However,  
as  Sharpe  notes:
[W]ith  the  increasing  ethnic  diversity  in  Canadian  society,  it  might  
be  argued  that  electoral  lines  should  be  drawn  so  as  to  maximize  the  
opportunity  for  an  ethnic  or  religious  group  to  vote  for  a  member  of  
its  community.91 
Using   the   success   that  New  Zealand   has   had   in   terms   of   incorporat-­
ing  their  indigenous  population  into  mainstream  politics  as  an  example,  
coupled  with  the  Court’s  interpretation  of  section  3,  Canada’s  electoral  
system  should  be  re-­visited  to  incorporate  Aboriginal  interests  through  
reserved  legislative  seats  in  Parliament.
3. The Jurisprudence Supports a Vision of Minority Seats
Section  3  case  law  has  been  clear  that  minority  groups  should  be  given  
greater  consideration.  As  Spafford  notes,  “a  theme  that  can  be  read  into  
90     Henderson,  supra note  76  at  244.
91     Sharpe,  supra note  86  at  183.
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the  Court’s  discussion  of  effective  representation  without  much  difficul-­
ty  is  that  of  minority  representation.”92    One  source  for  this  statement  is  
found  in  the  list  of  factors  to  be  consideredby  the  court  when  determin-­
ing  effective  representation.  These  include  geography,  community  his-­
tory,  community  interests  and  minority  representation.93  If  we  consider  
these  factors  in  the  context  of  Aboriginal  Canadians,  it  becomes  evident  
that  the  current  electoral  system  has  not  resulted  in  effective  or  equal  
representation.94 
i. Geography 
In  designing  the  electoral  system,  geographic  divisions  in  Canada  play  
an  important  role  and  ‘natural’  geographic  boundaries,  such  as  provin-­
cial  or  city   lines,   should  certainly  be   taken   into  account.  The  charac-­
teristics  of  Aboriginal  communities,  however,  present  a  specific  ‘geo-­
graphic’  concern.  Aboriginal  Canadians  form  a  collective  group  that  is  
dispersed  over  Canada  in  such  a  way  that  rarely  results  in  any  electoral  
constituency  having  a  dominant  Aboriginal  voice.95   If  one  purpose  of  
the  democratic  rights  enshrined  in  the  Constitution  is  to  provide  effec-­
tive  representation,  we  should  not  define  boundaries  solely  on  provin-­
cial  or  city  lines.  The  reality  of  Aboriginal  geographic  dispersion  must  
be  acknowledged  and  remedied.  
ii. Community history and interests 
That  the  Court  has  identified  these  two  factors  indicates  that,  although  
many  rights  guaranteed  under   the  Charter  are   individual   rights,   those  
accorded  under   section   3   and   our   notion   of   ‘democracy’   encompass-­
es  more   than  strictly   individual   rights.   Indeed,  Henderson  argues   that  
“without   a   proficiency  within   the  House   of  Commons   of   indigenous  
worldviews,   languages,  rights  and  treaties,   the  Canadian  legal  system  
92     Duff  Spafford,  “Effective  Representation:  Reference  Re  Provincial  Electoral  
Boundaries”,  Case  Comment  (1992),  56  Sask.  L.  Rev.  197  at  207  [Spafford].
93    Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4  at  para.  54.
94     Committee  for  Aboriginal  Electoral  Reform,  “The  Path  to  Electoral  Equality”  in  
Canada,  Royal  Commission  on  Electoral  Reform  and  Party  Financing,  Reforming 
Electoral Democracy: Final Report,  vol.  4  (Ottawa:  Minister  of  Supply  and  Services,  
1991)  at  241-­245.
95     One  of  the  few  exceptions  is  the  riding  of  Nunavut.  
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cannot  equitably  talk  about  authentic  democracy.”96  Thus,  by  only  con-­
sidering  the  history  and  interests  of  individuals,  Parliament  will  not  be  
adequately  reflective  of  Canadian  society,  as  society  is  also  comprised  
of  collective  groups.  The  interests  and  history  of  Aboriginals,  as  indi-­
viduals  and  as  a  collective  society  are  inadequately  represented  in  our  
current  electoral  system.  
iii. Minority representation
This  factor  demonstrates  that  the  Court  has  acknowledged  that  minor-­
ity  interests  should  be  considered  when  determining  whether  an  elec-­
toral   system  passes  constitutional  muster.  For  a  multitude  of   reasons,  
very  few  aboriginal  persons  are  elected  to  the  House  of  Commons  or  
provincial   assemblies,   or   are   appointed   to   the   Senate.   Beyond   sheer  
numbers,  Aboriginal  concerns  and  perspectives  are  not  engrained  into  
mainstream  policy  discussions  and  public  debate  –  instead,  the  ‘Abo-­
riginal  question’  has  always  remained  a  side   issue.97     As   the  majority  
held  in  Saskatchewan Boundaries,  if  we  are  going  to  “ensure  that  our  
legislative  assemblies  effectively   represent   the  diversity  of  our   social  
mosaic,”98  the  electoral  system  requires  minority  seats.  The  absence  of  
such  seats  creates  the  absence  of  effective  representation  for  Aboriginal  
Canadians.  In  the  words  of  a  Native  Council  representative:
Only   an  Aboriginal   person   and   only   an  Aboriginal   representative  
can   speak   about  whether   the   proposed   legislation   is   justifiable   in  
light  of  what  it  will  do  or  what  its  effect  on  the  Aboriginal  people  of  
Canada  will  be.99
Taking  into  consideration  all  of  the  factors  listed  above,  Aboriginal  Ca-­
nadians   should  be  given  guaranteed   seats   in  Parliament.   In   fact,   aca-­
demics  have  welcomed  the  
extent   to   which   the   Saskatchewan   Boundaries   decision   may  
facilitate   progressive   developments   such   as   enhanced   democratic  
96     Henderson,  supra note  76  at  245.
97     See  generally,  Henderson,  supra note  76.
98    Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4  at  para.  54.
99     RCERPF,  supra note  5  at  38.
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power  for  groups  of  people  who  have  suffered  from  an  historic  lack  
of  representation.100  
Some  have  even  suggested  that  there  is  language  in  the  decision  which  
Aboriginal  communities,  or  others,  might  use  in  an  attempt  to  force  leg-­
islatures  to  provide  a  special  system  of  representation,  such  as  guaran-­
teed   seats.  This   argument   follows   that   absent   such   special   considera-­
tions,  those  communities  would  be  denied  effective  representation.101 
4. Reserved Seats are the Best Alternative to Serve the Interests 
Protected in Section 3 of the Charter.
Reserved  seats  are  the  best  mechanism  to  begin  to  incorporate  Aborigi-­
nal  people   into  mainstream  political   institutions,  as   this  will  not  only  
achieve  the  rights  afforded  to  Aboriginals  under  section  3,  but  it  abides  
by   the   principle   that   people   should   be   represented   in   the   institutions  
that  have  power  over   their   lives.  Kymlicka  argues   that  because  many  
people  see  western  democracies  as  “unrepresentative,”  it  has  led  to  the  
idea  that  a  certain  number  of  seats  should  be  reserved  for  members  of  
disadvantaged  groups.  102 
However,  some  may  view  a  system  that  sets  aside  guaranteed  seats  
as  a  drastic  solution  and  may  believe  that  that  under-­representation  of  
Aboriginals  in  the  public  sphere  can  be  overcome  without  resorting  to  
the  idea  of  guaranteed  representation.103    One  alternative  to  guaranteed  
seats  could  be  an  entirely  new  electoral  system,  meant  to  facilitate  the  
representation  of  all  minority  groups.104    Indeed,  according  to  one  author,  
the  “primary  factor  for  the  under-­representation  of  Aboriginal  People  in  
Parliament   is   the  operation  of   the  Canadian  electoral   system  –  single  
member  plurality.”105    However,  although  a  proportional  system  is  spe-­
100   Roach,  supra note  89  at  200.
101   R.G.  Richards  and  T.  Irvine,  “Reference  Re  Provincial  Electoral  Boundaries:  An  
Analysis”  [unpublished].  
102     Will  Kymlicka,  Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 
(Toronto:  Oxford  University  Press,  1995)  at  132.  
103    Ibid.  at  133.
104     Kymlicka,  supra note  102  at  133.  
105     Trevor  Knight,  “Unconstitutional  Democracy?  A  Charter  Challenge  to  Canada’s  
Electoral  System”  (1999)  57  U.T.  Fac.  L.  Rev.  1  at  para.  29  [Knight].
124  –  DALHOUSIE  JOURNAL  OF  LEGAL  STUDIES
cifically  designed  to  better  allocate  seats  in  proportion  to  votes,  which  
in   turn  can  better   represent  minorities,  Aboriginals  and  all  Canadians  
cannot  and  should  not  depend  on  a  change  of  electoral  system  alone  to  
remedy  this  problem.  
First,  an  extensive  study,  which  canvassed  all  forms  of  electoral  sys-­
tems,  found  that  there  was  “no  simple  and  clear-­cut  picture  relating  the  
type  of  electoral  system  directly  to  differences  in  minority  political  sup-­
port.”106    In  a  public  space  filled  with  power  inequalities  and  historically  
engrained   positions   and   norms,   something  more   than   just   a   different  
electoral  system  is  required.
Second,   the   distrust   that   unfortunately  may   characterize   the   rela-­
tionship  some  Aboriginals  have  with  the  state  could  prevent  an  electoral  
system  –  even  one  with  proportional  representation  –  from  addressing  
Aboriginal  concerns.  Despite  the  fact  that  a  proportional  representative  
system  is  more  conducive  to  the  election  of  minorities,  there  is  still  no  
guarantee,   and  outcomes   continue   to  depend  on   the  perspectives   and  
relationship  between  the  state  and  Aboriginal  people.  A  more  assertive  
change  than  a  new  electoral  system  is  needed  in  order  to  forcefully  shake  
off  the  historical  perspectives  of  distrust.  As  one  author  notes,  “the  roots  
of  distrust  in  government  lie  in  something  other  than  the  rules  used  to  
translate  votes  into  seats  […]  the  electoral  system,  while  important,  re-­
mains  only  one  component  in  consociational  systems  of  democracy.”107 
Although  guaranteeing  seats  might  seem  as  though  the  electoral  system  
provides  Aboriginals   too  much  assistance   in   terms  of  getting  elected,  
Canada  will  never  make  any  progress  on  this   issue  without  admitting  
the  great   inequalities   that   exist  within   the  political   sphere.   In   the  ab-­
sence  of  reserved  seats,  this  paper  is  sceptical  whether  a  change  to  the  
electoral  system  alone  would  remedy  this  situation.  
A  separate  suggestion  that  is  commonly  put  forth  is  to  lessen  or  re-­
move  barriers  to  entrance  into  the  political  system.  This  could  include  
placing  a  cap  on  nomination  campaign  expenses  and  supplying  public  
funding  for  political  parties.108     Yet,  even  when  proposing   this,  Kym-­
licka  adds  that  specific  identification  of  candidates  from  disadvantaged  
106   Pippa  Norris,  Electoral Engineering – Voting Rules and Political Behaviour 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  Press,  2004)  at  224  [Norris].  
107  Ibid.  at  215  &  228.
108     Kymlicka,  supra note  102  at  133.
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groups   is  needed,  which   sounds   similar   to   selecting   individuals   from  
these  groups  to  be  placed  in  the  House  of  Commons.
Guaranteed   seats   would   enhance  Aboriginal   representation   better  
than   other   mechanisms   for   enhancing   minority   participation.   Parlia-­
mentarians  would  continuously  exist  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  the  
purpose  of  voicing  Aboriginal  viewpoints.  Although  there  are  presently  
Members  of  Parliament  with  Aboriginal  history,  the  structure  of  the  sys-­
tem  may  view  them  as  simply  an  individual  parliamentarian,  who  is  not  
there  to  speak  for  a  group.109  Even  if  this  point  was  debatable,  there  is  
surely  no  question   that   additional  Aboriginal  Members  of  Parliament  
will  assist   those  currently   there   to  voice  an  Aboriginal  perspective.  If  
aboriginal  rights  were  important  enough  to  recognize  in  section  35  of  
the  Constitution,  should  Canada  not  have  legitimate  spokespersons  for  
these  rights?     And  if   the  Constitution  provides  that  Aboriginal  people  
have  a  right  to  participate  at  constitutional  conferences  with  respect  to  
issues   that  directly  affect   them,110   it   is  not   time  to  consider  extending  
them  an  invitation  to  participate  in  the  governing  of  a  country  that  di-­
rectly  affects  them,  as  New  Zealand  did?    
5. Guaranteed Seats Will Make a Difference
The  argument  this  paper  presents  must  inevitably  endure  the  response  
that  a  few  Aboriginal  seats  will  not  make  a  substantive  difference  for  
the  inclusion  of  Aboriginals  in  the  political  process  and  will  not  meet  
the  definition  of  effective  representation  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  
identifies.  Any  comparison  to  New  Zealand  always  faces  the  argument  
that  characteristics  specific   to  New  Zealand  (such  as   the  smaller   land  
mass  and  a  higher  percentage  of  the  population  identified  as  indigenous)  
were   a   necessary   element   of   the   progress  New  Zealand   has  made   in  
partnering  with  the  Maori.  Indeed,  Maori  make  up  a  large  cultural  mi-­
nority  –  “and  this  single  fact  gives  political  weight  to  Maori  claims,  a  
dignity  often  denied  indigenous  people.”111    However,  it  is  the  position  
of  this  paper  that  if  Aboriginal  Canadians  have  endured  a  weaker  rela-­
109     Henderson,  supra note  76  at  319.
110  Constitution Act, 1982, supra note  2  at  s.  35.1(b).  See  also,  RCERPF, supra note  
5  at  48.
111   Palmer,  supra note  33  at  74.
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tionship  vis-­à-­vis  the  Canadian  government,  as  compared  to  the  Maori  
and  the  New  Zealand  Crown,  this  only  serves  to  reinforce  (as  oppose  to  
detract  from)  the  argument  that  something  drastic  and  concrete  must  be  
done  in  Canada  to  increase  Aboriginals  in  Parliament.  
Critics   have   also   noted   that  Maori   parliamentarians  were   viewed  
as   ‘token’   parliamentarians.   These   critics   challenge   why  Aboriginals  
should  be  given  guaranteed  seats,  if  this  is  likely  to  happen  in  the  House  
of  Commons  as  well.  In  Figueroa,  it  was  similarly  argued  that  smaller  
parties   cannot   influence  policy   in  Parliament,   so  why   should   they  be  
given  guaranteed  party  status?    Nevertheless,  a  few  Aboriginal  Parlia-­
mentarians  is  better  than  none  at  all.  If  the  criticism  is  that  a  few  seats  
will  not  be  enough,  than  certainly  the  lack  of  reserved  seats  that  Abo-­
riginals   currently  have   are  not   serving  Aboriginals   any  better.  As   the  
Court  noted  in  Figueroa,  “irrespective  of  their  capacity  to  influence  the  
outcome  of  an  election,  [smaller]  political  parties  act  as  both  a  vehicle  
and  outlet  for  the  meaningful  participation  of  individual  citizens  in  the  
electoral   process.”112      Similarly,   the   increased   numbers   of  Aboriginal  
people  in  Parliament  (even  if  they  are  not  the  majority)  creates  an  at-­
mosphere  where  the  Aboriginal  perspective  can  be  given  greater  consid-­
eration.  Also,  although  Maori  seats  initially  suffered  from  the  criticism  
that   they  were  essentially   ‘powerless’,   these  seats  eventually  evolved  
into  a  mechanism  that  allowed  Maori  to  take  part  in  many  functions  and  
levels  of  government.  There  is  no  reason  why  this  evolution  could  not  
occur  in  Canada  as  well.
All  of  the  arguments  made  above  contribute  to  the  overarching  no-­
tion  that  the  political  sphere  is  inherently  unequal.  This  inherent  inequal-­
ity  is  precisely  why  guaranteed  seats  will  make  a  difference  in  creating  a  
more  effective  method  of  representation,  because  achieving  democratic  
equality  means  combating  power  imbalances.  It  is  contended  that  soci-­
ety  does  not  police  who  expresses  themselves  the  loudest  under  the  right  
of   freedom   of   expression.  This   is   the  major   distinction   between   that  
fundamental  right  and  the  democratic  rights  guaranteed  under  section  
3.  Political  expression  and  participation  will  only   function   fairly,  and  
the  rights  under  section  3  will  only  be  maintained,  if  various  groups  and  
individuals  have  relatively  equal  abilities  to  participate.  
112    Figueroa, supra note  81  at  para.  49.
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The   courts   do   not   concern   themselves  with   this   level   of   equality  
with  certain  other  rights  in  the  Charter,  however  under  section  3,  cer-­
tain  groups  may  require  a  very  overt  method  to  have  the  opportunity  to  
“shout”  as  loud  as  others  in  the  political  arena.  This  may  explain  why  
a  system,  which  may  appear  paternalistic,  can  be  completely  justifiable  
and  can  eventually  led  to  fairer  results.  The  current  structure  of  Cana-­
da’s  electoral  system  is  faulty  in  terms  of  incorporating  Aboriginals  and  
in  terms  of  meeting  their  section  3  rights.  In  order  to  provide  Aboriginal  
people  the  representation  that  section  3  promises,  a  guarantee  is  needed  
and  anything  less  will  fall  short  of  achieving  these  rights.
6.  Such  an  Idea  can  Withstand  Justification  Under  Section  1  of  the  
Charter  and  Under  an  Individualistic  Theory  of  Rights.
i. Individual Rights
In  adopting  the  notion  of  “effective  representation,”  the  Supreme  Court  
of  Canada  has  rejected  the  strict  American  model  of  “one  person  one  
vote.”113  American   jurisprudence  would   likely   not   be   as   open   to   col-­
lectivist  perspective  on  voting  rights;;  in  construing  the  term  “effective,”  
the   United   States   Supreme   Court   has   closed   the   door   to   qualitative  
judgements  concerning   representation  and   specifically,   considerations  
of  group  interests.114  As  Sharpe  notes,  
we   see   a   distinctive   Canadian   approach   that   takes   into   account  
concerns   about   the   effectiveness   of   representation   as   well   as  
sensitivity  to  the  interests  of  groups  and  that  can  be  contrasted  with  
the  American  courts’  insistence  on  the  more  individualistic  principle  
of  one  person  one  vote.115  
The  distinction  between  rights  accorded  to  a  group  and  rights  accorded  
to  individuals  is  somewhat  nebulous,  and  are  often  inter-­related.  As  one  
author  argues,  a  member  of  the  collective  simultaneously  benefits  from  
rights  as  an  individual  as  well  as  group  rights,  and  many  times,  individ-­
113     Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4  at  para.  57.
114     Spafford,  supra note  92  at  198.    
115     Sharpe,  supra note  86  at  186.    
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ual  rights  are  often  meaningless  unless  group  rights  are  guaranteed.116 
This   rings   true   for  Aboriginal   persons.  As   a   distinct   and   identifiable  
group,  their  individual  right  to  vote  has  been  fairly  meaningless  in  terms  
of  achieving  effective  representation  for  all  types  of  Aboriginal  groups.
One  common  criticism  is  that  equality  in  Canada’s  individualist  po-­
litical  culture  does  not  allow  for  special  representation  of  groups  and  a  
liberal  theory  of  individual  equality  cannot  be  reconciled  with  reserv-­
ing   electoral   seats   for   some,   but   not   others.117     This   argument  would  
contend  that  all  Canadians  have  the  same  ‘legal  citizenship’  and  should  
therefore,   live   under   the   same   electoral   system.  However,   as   Carens  
notes,  even  when  people  share  a  common  legal  citizenship  (such  as  Ca-­
nadian)  the  assessment  of  representational  legitimacy  requires  the  need  
for  judgment  about  the  fit  between  electoral  mechanisms  and  particular  
political  identities  –  and  in  some  cases,  special  forms  of  representation  
may  be  appropriate.118
Indeed,  Canada’s  political  tradition  has  never  taken  the  primacy  of  
the   individual  as   its  only  starting  point.  Examples  such  as  section  35  
itself,  or  the  inclusion  of  language  rights  guarantees  in  the  Constitution,  
demonstrate   that   historically,   certain   sub-­sets   of   the   population   have  
been   collectively   protected   or   supported.119      In   fact,   Kymlicka   holds  
that   “group   representation   is   not   inherently   illiberal   or   undemocratic  
and  indeed  is  consistent  with  many  features  of  our  existing  systems  of  
representation.”120    Since  the  Supreme  Court  has  indicated  that  factors  
such  as  communities  of  interest  and  minority  groups  are  be  taken  into  
account  when  drawing  electoral  boundaries,  our  democracy  should  be  
very  hospitable  to  the  incorporation  of  these  non-­population  based  fac-­
tors  into  systems  of  electoral  distribution.121 
116   Pentney,  supra note  20  at  45-­47.
117   See  Knight,  supra note  6  at  paras.  45-­50.  And  see  generally,  Margaret  Moore,  
“Political  Liberalism  and  Cultural  Diversity”  (1995)  8  Can.  J.L.  &  Juris.  297.;;  
Larry  N.  Chartrand,  “Re-­Conceptualizing  Equality:  A  Place  for  Indigenous  Political  
Identity”  (2001)  19  Windsor  Y.B.  Access  Just.  243.  
118     Joseph  Carens,  Culture, Citizenship, and Community – A Contextual Exploration 
of Justice as Evenhandedness  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000)  at  176.  
119     Pentney,  supra note  20  at  2.
120     Kymlicka,  supra note  102  at  133.
121     See  generally  F.L.  Morton  and  Rainer  Knopff’s  discussion  of  federalism  and  
bicameralism  as  attesting  to  the  importance  of  group  representation  in  “Does  the  
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Patricia  Hughes’  notion  of  substantive  equality  is  of  particular  im-­
portance  here,   as   she  questions  what   it   really  means   to  be  politically  
equal:  “[a]ll  citizens  have  one  vote;;  yet  not  everyone  has  the  same  ac-­
cess   to   resources   to   influence   the   political   system.”122     According   to  
Hughes,   substantive   equality   demands   recognition   and   affirmation  of  
group  differences.  Guaranteed  seats  would  begin  to  remedy  that  which  
has  been  lacking  for  Aboriginal  people  –  an  equal  foundation  for  politi-­
cal  representation.  
ii. Section 1
This  paper  has  discussed  why  Aboriginal  groups  may  be  able  to  ground  
a  demand  for  increased  representation  in  an  action  challenging  the  con-­
stitutionality  of  the  current  electoral  system  under  section  3,  and  more  
specifically,  why  a  system  similar  to  New  Zealand’s  provides  an  ideal  
solution.  However,  the  analysis  cannot  end  there.  If  the  electoral  system  
were  found  to   infringe   the  section  3  rights  of  Aboriginal  persons,   the  
government  could  still  justify  this  infringement  under  section  1  of  the  
Charter.123 
The   government,   arguing   in   support   of   the   current   system,   could  
contend  that  it  is  preferable  to  have  pluralistic,  rather  than  race-­based  
elected  seats.  However,  Canada  already  divides  its  electoral  seats  on  the  
basis  of  communities  of  interests.  Certainly,  it  cannot  be  fair  to  provide  
‘effective  representation’  to  rural  communities  or  linguistic  communi-­
ties  -­  as  current  electoral  boundaries  do  -­  but  not  Aboriginal  communi-­
ties.124  
Not  only  is  this  specific  argument  not  persuasive  but,  additionally,  
section  3  violations  are  generally  difficult   to   justify  due   to   the  nature  
of   the   right   itself.  Under  a   section  3  analysis,   a  many  section  1-­style  
considerations  are  conducted,  leaving  very  little  room  for  argument  in  
Charter  Mandate  “One  Person,  One  Vote”?”  (1992)  30  Alta.  L.  Rev.  669.  
122     Patricia  Hughes  “Recognizing  Substantive  Equality  as  a  Foundational  
Constitutional  Principle”  (1999)  22  Dalhousie  L.J.  5  at  7.  
123    Charter, supra  note  3  at  section  1.  The  language  of  section  1  states:    “The  
Canadian  Charter  of  Rights  and  Freedoms  guarantees  the  rights  and  freedoms  set  out  
in  it  subject  only  to  such  reasonable  limits  prescribed  by  law  as  can  be  demonstrably  
justified  in  a  free  and  democratic  society.”
124     Knight,  supra note  6  at  paras.  110  –111.
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favour  of  justification.125    As  one  author  states,  “given  the  internal  bal-­
ancing  that  occurs  within  section  3,  the  Oakes  test  does  not  seem  to  have  
much  of  a  role  to  play.126  
Notable,  however,  is  the  argument  that,  should  changes  to  the  elec-­
toral  system  be  made,  other  groups  or  individuals  might  feel  their  sec-­
tion  3  rights  have  been  infringed.  In  other  words,  non-­Aboriginals  could  
argue   that   a   system   of   guaranteed   seats   disrupts   voter   parity   beyond  
what  is  constitutionally  permissible.  As  the  jurisprudence  under  section  
3  shows,  courts  point  to  several  factors  to  justify  diverging  from  perfect  
voter  parity.  If  a  challenge  to  reserved  seats  was  initiated,  it  would  be  in-­
cumbent  upon  a  complainant  to  “anticipate  which  of  the  countervailing  
factors  the  government  might  point  to  as  being  served  by  this  inequality,  
and  to  undermine  that  argument.”127  
For  many  of  the  reasons  previously  discussed,  it  is  unlikelythat  an  
attack  on  guaranteed  seats  as  constitutionally  unsound  would  succeed.  
Substantive  equality  and  democratic  fairness  demand  the  existence  of  
guaranteed  seats  in  order  for  Aboriginals  to  achieve  effective  represen-­
tation.  Further,  it  seems  illogical  that  a  program  could  both  fulfill  Abo-­
125     Knight,  supra note  6  at  para.  109.
126     Knight,  supra note  6  at  para.  109.  (Under  most  Charter  sections,  a  determination  
that  an  infringement  occurred  takes  into  account  the  right  protected  within  the  
specific  context  of  the  case.  Broad,  societal  considerations  are  usually  reserved  for  
analysis  under  section  1  where  it  must  be  decided  if  the  deleterious  effects  of  the  
infringed  Charter  right  can  be  outweighed  by  competing  public  concerns.  However,  
section  3,  as  the  courts  have  interpreted  it,  envelops  broad  factors  such  as  equality  
in  political  discourse  and  minority  rights  –  and  thus,  many  of  the  ‘typical’  section  
1  considerations  are  dealt  with  at  this  stage.  If  these  large-­scale  considerations  lead  
to  the  conclusion  that  section  3  has  been  breached,  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  later  
find  these  same  societal  concerns  can  be  used  to  justify  the  prolongation  of  this  
infringement).  
127     Mark  Carter,  “Reconsidering  the  Charter  and  Electoral  Boundaries”  (1999)  22  
Dalhousie  L.J.  53  at  16.  Note  that  the  court  has  also  found  that  electoral  districts  
went  beyond  what  section  3  will  allow;;  see  Friends of Democracy v. Northwest 
Territories (Commissioner) (1999), 171  D.L.R.  (4th)  551  (N.W.T.S.C.),  leave  to  
appeal  to  the  C.A.  refused,  176  D.L.R.  (4th)  661.  (In  this  case,  the  changes  made  
to  electoral  boundary  lines  caused  gross  under-­representation  to  other  groups,  
violating  the  right  of  those  groups  under  section  3.  Therefore,  any  seats  guaranteed  
to  Aboriginal  persons  would  have  to  be  accorded  in  such  a  way  to  minimally  infringe  
the  representation  of  others).    
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riginal  democratic  rights  and  violate  the  section  3  rights  of  others  at  the  
same  time.  
If  faced  with  having  to  justify  a  change  to  an  electoral  system  with  
guaranteed  seats,  the  government  would  have  to  point  to  an  objective  
this   change  was   attempting   to  meet,   as  well   as   demonstrate   that   this  
system  is  both   rationally  connected   to   that  objective,  and   impairs   the  
rights  of  others  as  minimally  as  possible.  Comments  the  Court  made  in  
Harper  could  be  instructive.  In  Harper,  the  Court  noted  that  laws  which  
limited  third  party  spending  were  addressed  at  the  harm  of  electoral  un-­
fairness.  It  was  found  that  one  of  the  objectives  of  such  legislation  were  
to  promote  equality  in  the  political  discourse.128      An  argument  could  be  
made  that  a  similar  objective  of  equality  in  political  discourse  is  behind  
the   system  of   guaranteed   seats.  As   previously   discussed,   the   govern-­
ment  could  demonstrate  how  this  system  was  connected  to  the  goal  of  
political   equality,   and  most   importantly,   that   no   other  method  would  
fully  realize  the  democratic  rights  of  Aboriginals  –  thus,  making  guaran-­
teed  seats  the  most  minimally  impairing  option.  Finally,  the  government  
would  have  to  show  that  the  salutary  effects  of  promoting  equality  and  
accessibility  in  the  electoral  system  for  Aboriginal  people  outweigh  the  
any  deleterious  effects  to  the  electoral  system  or  other  voters.  
Additional  fertile  arguments  can  be  found  in  Saskatchewan Bounda-
ries,  where  the  urban  populations  contended  that  it  was  unfair  that  dif-­
ferent  district  allotments  were  drawn  for  rural  constituents.  The  Court  
found  that  the  section  3  rights  of  urban  voters  were  not  violated,  as  voter  
parity  is  not  the  only  consideration  and  effective  representation  is  the  
ultimate  goal.  If  “effective  representation”  is  the  ultimate  goal,  reserved  
seats  for  Aboriginals  can  be  justified,  as  can  the  re-­drawing  of  electoral  
boundaries  to  include  a  riding  with  a  lower  population  but  comprised  
mainly  of  Aboriginal  people.  
In  the  Saskatchewan Boundaries  case,  the  court  stated  that  rural  con-­
stituents  are  ‘harder’  to  serve  because  of  difficultly  of  communications  
and  transport  and  therefore  the  goal  of  effective  representation  may  jus-­
tify  somewhat  lower  voter  populations  in  these  ridings.129  This  reason-­
ing  can  be   related   to   the  creation  of  guaranteed  seats.   In  some  ways,  
128    Harper, supra note  85  at  para.  90.  (Note  that  the  section  1  analysis  conducted  
in Harper  was  undertaken  pursuant  to  a  finding  that  section  2(b)  of  the  Charter  had  
been  violated).
129    Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra note  4  at  para.  78.
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Aboriginal  Canadians  are  equally  “hard  to  serve,”  as  it  is  difficult  for  
Aboriginal  perspectives  to  be  considered  in  the  mainstream  policy  dis-­
course.  Indeed,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  rely  on  the  normal  allocation  
of  electoral  seats  to  combat  the  inherent  inequalities  of  politics,  break  
the  historic  and  unfortunate  cycle  of  aboriginal  distrust  with  the  Crown,  
and  give  Aboriginals  fair  representation  in  the  House  of  Commons
CONCLUSION
This  paper  should  not  be  read  as  an  attempt  to  argue  that  section  35  of  
Constitution  was  enacted  as  a  specific  tool   to  increase  Aboriginal  po-­
litical  participation,  and  has  failed.  Clearly,  the  broader  goal  of  section  
35  was  recognition  of  the  importance  and  distinctiveness  of  Aboriginal  
rights.   However,  Aboriginals   have   always   been   under-­represented   in  
mainstream  political  institutions  and  thus  this  paper  has  argued  it  is  time  
to  look  beyond  section  35  as  a  solution  to  this  problem,  given  that  it  has  
not  provided  Aboriginals  with  increased  opportunity  for  representation  
and  participation  in  the  public  sphere.  The  analysis  should  instead  turn  
to  section  3,  as  this  continuing  lack  of  opportunity  constitutes  a  breach  
of  the  democratic  right  of  “effective  representation”  guaranteed  to  Abo-­
riginals  under  the  Charter.      
In  comparison,  New  Zealand  did  not  initially  insert  a  general  ‘rights’  
clause  pertaining  to  the  Maori  in  their  constitution,  and  the  absence  of  
constitutional  recognition  left  a  space  for  other  required  action.  In  order  
to  appease  the  Maori  population,  New  Zealand  took  action  in  the  form  
of  guaranteeing   seats   to  Maori   in   their  House  of  Representatives.  As  
this  paper  has  depicted,  this  mechanism  has  ultimately  had  very  posi-­
tive  –  even  if  originally  unintended  effects  in  terms  of  providing  Maori  
an  opportunity   to  meaningfully  participate   in   the  governance  of  New  
Zealand.
A  comparison  of  these  two  approaches,  taken  by  comparable  liberal  
democracies,   enlightens   the  analysis  of  Canadian  Aboriginal  political  
participation  in  two  ways.  The  first  of  these  is  that  a  guarantee  of  seats  in  
mainstream  political  institutions  is  a  legitimate  method,  even  in  a  liberal  
democracy,  to  increase  the  overall  participation  of  a  minority  group;;  and  
second,  that  only  such  an  assertive  method  has  sufficient  force  to  com-­
bat  the  inequalities  of  the  political  sphere  and  meet  the  right  of  effective  
representation  that  section  3  of  the  Charter  guarantees.
